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NOTE
OPENING THE FLOODGATES?:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE
POLITICAL ACTIVITY AFTER
CITIZENS UNITED
JOHN PERSINGER*
I would love to have ads on TV against me saying, don't vote for
Mike Capuano, he's a horrendous guy, brought to you by the
Exxon Corporation.
- Rep. Michael Capuano (D-MA)'
I. INTRODUCTION
During his 2010 State of the Union address, President
Obama took the unusual approach of criticizing the Supreme
Court, with several justices sitting mere steps from the House of
Representatives dais, for an opinion the Court had delivered only
a few days earlier. The President remarked:
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week,
the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe
will open the floodgates for special interests-including
foreign corporations-to spend without limit in our elec-
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2012; A.B., His-
tory, Harvard College, 2003. I would like to thank Professor Lloyd Mayer,
whose Election Law class sparked an interest in the topic and whose edits
helped greatly improve the quality of this Note. I would also like to thank Pro-
fessor Julian Velasco, who provided guidance on the corporate law issues, and
Professor Richard Painter, whose conversations helped flesh out the corporate
governance issues. The most important thanks go to my in-house editor-my
wife, Sarah Smiles Persinger.
1. Rep. Michael Capuano (D-MA), sponsor of the Shareholder Protection
Act of 2011, made this comment at a congressional hearing on Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Corporate Governance After Citizens United: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Corporate Governance
After Citizens United Hearings].
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tions. I don't think American elections should be bankrol-
led by America's most powerful interests .... 2
The President's ominous warning for the future of Ameri-
can politics stemmed from his interpretation of the Court's deci-
sion in Citizens United v. FEC.' Associate Justice Samuel Alito, one
of the justices in attendance, mouthed silently his disagreement
with the President's interpretation.' Commentators argued that
both individuals breached the normally staid decorum of the
State of the Union.' Rarely does the Supreme Court even
receive mention in the President's State of the Union Address."
In a divisive election year, however, Citizens United added to the
political turmoil.
The controversy began with a motion for a preliminary
injunction by a nonprofit corporation.' To resolve the non-
profit's challenge, the Court decided that it had to determine
whether the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA")5
unconstitutionally prohibited corporations from using general
treasury funds for independent political campaign expendi-
tures.' By recognizing that corporations, and presumably unions
2. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Address Before a Joint
Session of Congress on the State of the Union Uan. 27, 2010), in 156 CONG.
REC. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 State of the Union].
3. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
4. Justice Alito mouthed "not true, not true," in response to President
Obama's criticism of the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision. Martin Kady
II, justice Alito Mouths 'Not True,'PoI.rAco (Jan. 27, 2010, 10:08 PM), http://
www.politico.com/blogs/politicolive/0110/JusticeAlitosYou lie-moment.
html.
5. See Brad Knickerbocker, Obama vs. Alito: Political Dust-Up During State of
the Union, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 30, 2010, available at http://www.cs
monitor.com/USA/2010/0130/Obama-vs.-Alito-Political-dust-utp-during-State-
of-the-Union.
6. See Tony Mauro, High Court is Rare Topic for State of the Union Speeches,
Bio. OF LEGAl. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010, 11:43 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.
com/blt/2010/01 /high-court-is-rare-topic-for-state-of-the-u nionspeeches. html
(explaining how other Presidents have mentioned the Supreme Court by name
only nine times since 1913, and none have given direct criticisms of court
Opinions).
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2006).
9. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886. It is important to note that not all of
the justices agreed that the Court had to reach this issue. AssociateJustice John
Paul Stevens, writing in dissent, argued that the Court could have decided the
case on three narrower grounds: (1) "a feature-length film distributed through
video-on-demand does not qualify as an 'electioneering communication' under
§ 203 of BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 441b"; (2) "§ 501(c) (4) nonprofits that accept only a
de minimis amount of money from for-profit corporations" could be exempted
from the statute; and (3) "feature-length video-on-demand film [that] looks so
unlike the types of electoral advocacy Congress has found deserving of regula-
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as well, are entitled to First Amendment protection for political
speech, the Court struck down the limits on expenditures.' The
idea that corporations are entitled to the same First Amendment
rights as individuals did not resonate with the American public,"
and politicians moved quickly to capitalize on this public
opinion.12
Citizens United is not the first time that the country has been
concerned about corporate political activity.1" Each time
national attention has focused on the issue, Congress has
responded with mixed results.14 Drawing on this history, this
Note will attempt to provide a better understanding of why the
Court reached its decision in Citizens United and why Congress's
efforts to reform the campaign finance system should fail. Fore-
most among these reasons is the fact that Congressional reform
efforts, driven by the mistaken view that corporate political activ-
ity is not an "ordinary business decision,"" will create unneces-
sary and burdensome regulations.'" These regulations would
have a negative effect on corporations, regardless of size or level
of political activity, without truly limiting corporate influence in
the U.S. political system. Part II of this Note will detail how
America's corporate campaign finance system developed, the
motivations for regulating the system, and whether regulation
has had much of an impact on the system. Part III will explain
what the Court decided in Citizens United, why it was significant,
and what the Court left unresolved. Finally, Part IV will argue
that the congressional response to Citizens United creates an
unnecessary regulatory burden for for-profit corporations.!
tion" could be decided under an as-applied challenge. Id. at 936-38 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See also Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of
Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REv. 581, 585-90 (2011) (outlining the history of sharp
division in the Court in the area of campaign finance).
10. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
11. See Dan Eggen, Corporate Sponsorship is Campaign Issue onWhich Both
Parties Can Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010, at A15.
12. See infra Part III.D.
13. See infra Part II.
14. Id.
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See infra Part IV.C.
17. The corporation at issue in Citizens United was a not-for-profit corpora-
tion. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). Although the Court's decision applies to both
for-profit and not-for-profit corporations, the Shareholder Protection Act of
2011 and similar legislative proposals only address for-profit corporations' polit-
ical activity. Therefore, this Note will only discuss the potential regulatory bur-
dens for for-proft corporations. See Shareholder Protection Act of 2011, H.R.
2517, 112th Cong. (2011).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATIONS AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
A. A First Attempt At Curbing Corporate Political Activity
When President Obama claimed that Citizens United
"reversed a century of law,"' he was referencing America's first
federal campaign finance law: the Tillman Act." Governmental
regulation of corporate political involvement did not emerge
until the end of the nineteenth century, with the states taking the
initial lead after the 1896 presidential elections. For his success-
ful presidential campaign, Republican William McKinley spent "a
then unheard of $7 million, mostly solicited from corporations,"
to defeat the populist Williams Jennings Bryan." In retaliation,
several pro-Bryan states enacted prohibitions on direct corporate
contributions to political campaigns.2 '
Federal regulation of corporate political donations only
became an issue after a state inquiry into self-dealing by corpo-
rate executives. In 1905, the State of New York initiated an inves-
tigation to determine whether executives at major life insurance
companies-including the state's three largest, New York Life
Insurance Company, Equitable Life Assurance Society, and
Mutual Life Insurance Company-used company finances for
personal dealings. The Joint Committee of the Senate and
Assembly of the State of New York to Investigate and Examine
into the Business and Affairs of Life Insurance Companies Doing
Business in the State of New York eventually turned its focus to
political contributions by these insurance companies." Several
executives testified to donating specific amounts to help the re-
election efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt in the 1904
18. 2010 State of the Union, supra note 2.
19. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1907 (Tillman Act), Pub. L. No. 59-
36, 34 Stat. 864.
20. Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform: Searching for Corruption in
All the Wrong Places, 2003 CATO SuP. CT. Riv. 187, 191 (2002-2003); see also Mel-
vin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 Acn. Gov'T L. R.v. 1,
10-12 (2008) (detailing how McKinley's campaign manager coordinated dona-
tions from corporations across the country).
21. Smith, supra note 20, at 191 (noting that Nebraska was Bryan's home
state and Missouri, Florida, and Tennessee had large Democratic majorities in
their legislatures); see also Urofsky, supra note 20, at 13 (explaining that the four
states, Nebraska, Missouri, Florida, and Tennessee, passed the bans "partly out
of political pique"); Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations, Agency
Costs, and Campaign Finance Laws, 92 GEo. L.J. 871, 884 (2004).
22. See Urofsky, supra note 20, at 14-15; Winkler, supra note 21, at
887-93.
23. See Urofsky, supra note 20, at 14-15; Winkler, supra note 21, at
891-93.
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election. 24 These testimonies and the Committee's efforts to
expose the issue of corporate cash for political campaigns
became known as the "Great Wall Street Scandal" or the "New
York Life Insurance Scandal," spurring an intense public outcry
and media examination about the role of corporations in financ-
ing the domestic political system.2 5
Even though a proposed federal campaign finance law had
failed only a few years earlier, the Great Wall Street Scandal and
President Roosevelt's call for reform created the momentum for
the first ban on corporate political donations.26 In 1901, Repub-
lican Senator William E. Chandler of New Hampshire had spon-
sored a bill that banned corporate contributions, but the bill
never reached the floor for a vote.2 ' Four years after the bill's
death, the Great Wall Street Scandal shifted public opinion of
corporate political involvement.28  Sensing this shift in public
opinion, President Roosevelt used his annual message to Con-
gress, on December 5, 1905, to propose that "[a]ll contributions
by corporations to any political committee or for any political
purpose should be forbidden by law."29 He emphasized that
24. See Urofsky, supra note 20, at 14-15; Winkler, supra note 21, at
891-93. The Republican Roosevelt defeated Democratic nominee Alton B.
Parker in that election. Supreme Court Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter later
quoted Parker's concern over corporate political involvement, when deciding a
case about union dues paying for express advocacy. United States v. UAW-CIO,
352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957) (quoting Contributions to Political Committees In Presiden-
tial and Other Campaigns: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Election of President, Vice-
President, and Representatives. in Cong., 59th Cong. (1906) ("The greatest moral
question which now confronts us is, Shall the trusts and corporations be pre-
vented from contributing money to control or aid in controlling elections?")).
25. See Urofsky, supra note 20, at 14-15; Winkler, supra note 21, at
891-93.
26. See Urofsky, supra note 20, at 15-17. It is interesting to highlight Pres-
ident Roosevelt's role in the first efforts to reform the campaign finance system.
While he did call for a ban on corporate campaign contributions, it was the
exposure of corporate contributions to his presidential campaign that spurred
reform in the first place. See id.
27. S. 5849, 57th Cong. (1901); 34 CONG. REc. 1821 (1901); see also RoB-
ERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND CouRTs: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAw 4-5 (1988) (providing historical context).
28. See MUTCH, supra note 27, at 2 (explaining how various media outlets
around the country reported on the testimonies because the hearings had
"caused a profound sensation as it furnished the first tangible evidence of con-
nections between [an] insurance company and a political party") (quoting
George W Perkins On Stand, NEW-YORK TRIBUNE, Sept. 16, 1905, at 1)); Urofsky,
supra note 19, at 14-15; Winkler, supra note 21, at 891-93.
29. 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905).
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"directors should not be permitted to use stockholders' money
for such purposes.""o
With public opinion supporting reform and a Republican
president providing political cover, Congress now had the politi-
cal will and capital to regulate campaign finance for the first
time. Senator Chandler tried initially to get another Republican
senator to sponsor a new campaign finance bill."' When that
failed, he turned to his friend, the populist and racist Senator
Benjamin R. Tillman, a Democrat from South Carolina, to initi-
ate a bill.3 2 While the bill passed in the Senate without debate,
the House of Representatives adjourned for the 1906 congres-
sional elections without voting on the bill." When the new Con-
gress returned and with the Republicans maintaining the
majority, the House passed the bill and President Roosevelt
signed it into law on January 26, 1907."4 As the first federal cam-
paign finance law, the Tillman Act prohibited corporations and
national banks from donating to the campaigns of candidates for
public office.35
While the Act banned corporate contributions to political
campaigns, several shortcomings prevented the Act from stem-
ming the full influence of corporations on elections. In regard
to elections, the Act did not initially prohibit corporate contribu-
tions to primary campaigns."n As for the type of corporations
that fell under the Act, the Act only applied to corporations that
30. Id.
31. See MUTCH, supra note 27, at 5.
32. Id. Senator Tillman played a unique role in these early reform
efforts. Tillman had been a close friend of Senator Chandler, the original Sen-
ate promoter of campaign finance, and they shared a mutual dislike of Presi-
dent Roosevelt. See FRANCIS BUTLER SIMKINS, PITCHFORK BEN TILLMAN: SOUTH
CAROl INIAN, 18-19, 408-18 (1944) (detailing how, after President Roosevelt's
staff rescinded an invitation to the White House, Tillman "declared that he had
been treated 'in a cowardly and ungentlemanly way' by 'this ill-bred creature
who is accidentally President'"; Allison R. Hayward, Revisiting the Fable of
Reform, 45 HARV. J. ON Li(is. 421, 441 (2008). His motivation for banning cor-
porate contributions may not have been shareholder protection, which Presi-
dent Roosevelt pushed. Instead, he may have been motivated by his "over-
arching racial agenda, which aimed to attack and limit the power of northern
businesses," whom he saw "as an enemy of [his] violent, agrarian, segregationist
policies." Bradley A. Smith, A Moderate, Modern Campaign Finance Reform Agenda,
12 NEXUS 3, 4 (2007).
33. See MUTcH, supra note 27, at 6-7.
34. Id.; Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864.
35. See id.
36. See id. Congress eventually extended the ban on corporate contribu-
tions to primary campaigns with the 1911 amendments to the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, also known as the 1910 Publicity Act. Publicity of Political Contri-
butions Act, Pub. L. No. 61-274, 36 Stat. 822 (1910).
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had been chartered federally, as opposed to state-charted corpo-
rations.3 ' Federally charted corporations, such as railroads, have
been described as representing "only a small percentage of com-
panies" at the time." Even corporations that fell under the Act's
jurisdiction found ways to get around the direct contributions
ban." Instead of donating cash, corporations provided in-kind
items, such as office space, equipment, free travel, and even
employees.40 Most importantly, corporate contributions did not
subside because the Tillman Act provided no enforcement mech-
anism." Without any instruction from Congress on how to
police Tillman Act violations, the federal government's first
attempt to regulate corporate political activity lacked any
effectiveness.
B. Political Reactions Spur Another Attempt At Reform
Despite the Tillman Act's many shortcomings, Congress did
not further regulate corporate political activity until union influ-
ence over election campaigns provoked a Republican backlash.
Just as the Republicans had relied on corporations to fund the
presidential campaign for the party's nominee at the turn of the
century, Democrats began to rely on unions as campaign finan-
ciers beginning in the 1930's."2 Republicans found an opportu-
nity to restrict union political contributions when the United
Mine Workers went on strike in the midst of World War II." In
response to the strike, Congress passed the War Labor Disputes
37. See Tillman Act of 1907.
38. Urofsky, supra note 20, at 17; see also MUTCH, supra note 27, at 7 ("Sen-
atorJoseph P. Foraker (R-OH), who chaired the subcommittee formed to con-
sider the measure, did not believe Congress had the power to regulate state-
charted corporations, even those engaged in interstate commerce, and he
struck out the words 'or any corporation engaged in interstate commerce or
foreign commerce.'" (quoting S. REP. No. 3056, at 1 (1906))).
39. Urofsky, supra note 20, at 17; BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE
FoLLr OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 24 (2001).
40. See SMITH, supra note 39, at 24; Urofsky, supra note 20, at 17.
41. See Tillman Act of 1907.
42. See GEORGE THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE?: AMERICAN CAM-
PAIGN FINANCING PRACTICES FROM 1789 TO THE PRESENT 69-71 (1973) (detailing
how the Democratic National Committee had spent only $2.2 million in 1932,
leaving the committee $600,000 in debt, but then raised nearly $500,000 from
the Congress of Industrial Organizations alone for the 1936 efforts); Hayward,
supra note 32, at 441-54; Joseph E. Kallenbach, Taft-Hartley and Union Political
Contributions and Expenditures, 33 MINN. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1948); Urofsky, supra
note 20, at 22-29; Winkler, supra note 21, at 928-30.
43. See Hayward, supra note 32, at 441-54; Kallenbach, supra note 42, at
4-5; Urofsky, supra note 20, at 22-29.
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Act, also known as the Smith-Connally Act of 1943.4' The Act
intended "to secure defense production against work stop-
pages,"45 but it also included a provision that prohibited unions
from making political donations until the end of the war."
Unions now faced the same prohibitions on campaign contribu-
tions as corporations.
Similar to the corporate reaction to the Tillman Act, the
Smith-Connally Act did not end union influence in election cam-
paigns. Unions created opportunities to support political candi-
dates by means other than direct contributions.4 7 Congress
44. War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-89,
57 Stat. 163 (1943). Congress overrode President Roosevelt's veto to enact the
law. See Urofsky, supra note 20, at 26. President Roosevelt did not veto the bill
because he disapproved of the regulations on union political activity. Rather,
he vetoed the bill because he thought it constrained the President's powers
during wartime labor disputes. In fact, he seemed open to the ban. 89 CONG.
RiEc. 6487-88 (1943) ("If there be merit in the prohibition, it should not be
confined to wartime, and careful consideration should be given to the appro-
priateness of extending the prohibition to other nonprofit organizations.").
Although President Roosevelt's veto did not weigh in on the merits of the
ban on union campaign contributions, supporters and opponents of the mea-
sure did weigh in before a House hearing on the issue. To Regulate Labor Organi-
zations: Hearing on H.R. 804 and H.R. 1483 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Labor, 78th Cong. (1943). Congressman Gerald W. Landis (R-IN), the author
of the union campaign contribution ban, testified as to why he proposed the
measure. Id. at 2. He commented that he noticed "[t]he public was aroused by
many rumors of huge war chests being maintained by labor unions, of enor-
mous fees and dues being extorted from war workers, of political contributions
to parties and candidates which later were held as clubs over the head of high
Federal officials." Id. Through his bill, he sought to "put labor unions on
exactly the same basis, insofar as their financial activities are concerned, as cor-
porations have been on for many years." Id. at 1. In opposition to this bill,
American Federation of Labor representative Lewis Hines questioned:
[i]f it has been good over the years for the employers to elect Repre-
sentatives to Congress-and there are many Representatives in Con-
gress elected by employers-why is it not good for organized labor
and the trade-union movement to put forth a little effort and financial
support, if necessary, to help elect their friends who have passed
humanitarian legislation?
Id. at 85.
45. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 578 (1957).
46. Smith-Connally Act of 1943 § 9.
47. The most notable avenue around the Smith-Connally Act restrictions
resulted in the creation of the first political action committee ("PAC"). The
Congress of Industrial Organizations established a PAC that solicited voluntary
contributions from members for the sole purpose of engaging in overt, partisan
political activity. See Hayward, supra note 32, at 454-55; Urofsky, supra note 20,
at 26; Winkler, supra note 21, at 929-30; Kallenbach, supra note 42, at 6-8. See
also Separate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected PACs, FiE. ELECTION COMM'N,
1-2, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ssfvnonconnected.pdf (last visited
Sept. 15, 2011).
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failed to provide an enforcement mechanism in the legislation,
so violations often went unpunished and creative measures were
never questioned." Lastly, since Congress passed the bill as a
war-time measure, the Smith-Connally Act permitted the political
contribution ban to expire when the war terminated.4 9
The temporary prohibitions became permanent after con-
gressional Republicans seized another political opportunity and,
in the process, created more regulation for corporate political
activity. Republicans gained majorities in both the House and
the Senate after the 1946 elections. 0 Overriding President
Harry Truman's veto," the new Congress enacted a sweeping
overhaul of the system that regulated labor union activity.52 The
newly enacted Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, also
known as the Taft-Hartley Act, made permanent the Smith-Con-
nally Act's prohibition on union campaign contributions, and it
regulated political activity in new ways." The Taft-Hartley Act
prohibited expenditures made to support a candidate for public
office, whereas previously only direct cash contributions had
been prohibited." The Act also applied to primaries in addition
to general elections.5 5 Most importantly for the purposes of this
Note, Congress extended these prohibitions to corporations as
well as unions.
C. The Modern Campaign Finance System
The Taft-Hartley Act did not end corporate political activity,
and political motivations spurred Congress to enact one more
48. Smith-Connally Act of 1943 § 10.
49. Id. § 10; see also Kallenbach, supra note 42, at 6 (explaining that the
timing for expiration would be "within six months after termination of hostili-
ties as determined by the President, or sooner, upon the passage of a concur-
rent resolution by Congress").
50. See Hayward, supra note 32, at 456; Urofsky, supra note 20, at 27.
51. In his message returning the 1947 Labor-Management Relations Act
without approval, President Truman referred to the Act as a "dangerous intru-
sion on free speech, unwarranted by any demonstration of need, and quite for-
eign to the stated purposes of this bill." H.R. Doc. No. 80-334, at 9 (1947).
52. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of Title 29).
53. Id. at sec. 304 (repealed).
54. Id. By prohibiting expenditures, Congress banned corporations from
donating the in-kind items that arose as an avenue around the Tillman Act
restrictions. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
55. Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 § 304.
56. Id. Whereas the Tillman Act only pertained to federally-chartered
corporations, the Taft-Hartley Act regulated "any corporation organized by
authority of any law of Congress." Id.; see also supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
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series of regulations that shaped the modern campaign finance
system. When the Taft-Hartley Act passed, Congress regulated
the campaign finance system for the third time" without provid-
ing any governmental structure to administer and enforce the
regulations." Similar to the Tillman Act"' and the Smith-Con-
nally Act,"o the Taft-Hartley Act remained largely ineffective."
Rather than curtailing the flow of money into politics, campaign
costs increased dramatically in the 1950's and 1960's.62 Demo-
crats, with control of Congress and fear of Republican reliance
on corporate financial support, initiated a series of campaign
finance reforms in the late 1960's."
In the 1970's, a series of campaign finance regulations
altered corporate political involvement in several ways. The first
initiative, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
("FECA")," permitted corporations to use general treasury funds
to "establish, operate and solicit voluntary contributions for the
organization's separate segregated fund.""5  Corporations use
separate segregated funds, known as political action committees
("PACs")," to "make contributions and expenditures to influ-
ence federal elections."6 7 After the Watergate scandal exposed
President Richard Nixon's campaign financing practices," Con-
57. For the two previous attempts see Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-
36, 34 Stat. 864; Smith-Connally Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163.
58. See Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.
59. Tillman Act of 1907.
60. Smith-Connally Act of 1943.
61. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, BreachingaLeakingDam?: Corporate Money and
Elections, 4 CHARIFSTON L. RFV. 91, 98 (2009); Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement
of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALA.' L. & POt'Y Ri.v.
279, 281 (1991) (quoting the FEC Chairman saying that there had been little or
no campaign finance enforcement for well over half a century).
62. The increase in the costs of campaigns was mainly due to the prolifer-
ation of television advertising, and the expensive costs associated with such
advertising. For example, candidates for federal office spent an estimated $140
million in 1952. Twenty-years later that number would triple to an estimated
$425 million in 1972. See Urofsky, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
63. See Smith, supra note 20, at 6.
64. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225,
86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 2, 18, 26, and 47).
65. Appendix 4: The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History, Fi).
ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Sept.
25, 2011).
66. See Hayward, supra note 32, at 441-54.
67. Separate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected PACs, FED. ELECTION
CoMM'N, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ssfvnonconnected.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 25, 2011).
68. See generally Urofsky, supra note 20, 50-55.
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gress enacted several amendments to FECA in 1974." The most
significant amendment created the Federal Election Commission
("FEC") and empowered the agency to enforce campaign
finance laws.70 Another significant amendment, which affected
corporations, limited the amount that could be spent on political
expenditures.7
Foreshadowing Citizens United and the corporate political
activity controversy, the Supreme Court struck down these latest
regulations on free speech grounds.7 1 SenatorJames L. Buckley,
a Republican from New York, and Eugene McCarthy, a former
Democratic Senator from Minnesota, challenged the constitu-
tionality of several aspects of the 1974 amendments, including
the limits on expenditures for individuals. 3 The Supreme Court
declared the expenditure limits an unconstitutional infringe-
69. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in
scattered sections of Titles 2, 5, 18, 26, and 47).
70. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (2006); see also Appendix 4: The Federal Election Cam-
paign Laws: A Short History, supra note 65 ("The Commission was given jurisdic-
tion in civil enforcement matters, authority to write regulations and
responsibility for monitoring compliance with the FECA. Additionally, the
amendments transferred from [Government Accountability Office] to the Com-
mission the function of serving as a national clearinghouse for information on
the administration of elections.").
71. 2 U.S.C. § 431. At the time, this amendment affected corporations
indirectly since corporations could only make expenditures through PACs. See
supra note 44. However, after Citizens United declared that corporations could
use general treasury funds for express advocacy, any impact on expenditure
amounts is relevant. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Express
advocacy pertains to those "communications that in express terms advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office." Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 & 44 n.52 (1976) (explaining that the "magic words" of
express advocacy include "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for,"
"Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," or "reject").
72. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50-51. The Court did, however, uphold many of
FECA's provisions, including the limits on individual contributions to cam-
paigns, the disclosure and reporting requirements, and the public financing of
presidential elections. Id. at 26, 66-68, 108.
73. Id. at 23. Buckley also decided a constitutional challenge to the 1974
amendment's limitation on direct contributions. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006).
The Court upheld the constitutionality of these limitations. Buckley, 424 U.S. at
27, 29 (holding that "the weighty interests served by" preventing corruption
and "quid pro quo" agreements "are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon
First Amendment freedoms caused by" the ceilings on direct contributions). As
applied to corporations, this ruling did not drastically affect their freedom of
political speech because these organizations had been prohibited from making
direct contributions to candidates since 1907. See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L.
No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864.
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ment on the freedom of speech.74 To get to this point, the Court
clarified that spending money on political activity is speech, not
conduct, and thus protected by the First Amendment." Even
though Buckley challenged the limits on individuals, and not cor-
porations or unions, this distinction laid the foundation for the
Court's decision in Citizens United."
Long before Citizens United, the Supreme Court relied on
the idea that money is political speech in order to permit some
types of corporate political activity. In the 1970's, several banks
and corporations, located in Massachusetts challenged the con-
stitutionality of a state law that prohibited corporations from
making any expenditures "for the purpose of ... influencing or
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters."7 7
The corporations wanted to spend money in opposition to a state
referendum.7 ' The Supreme Court struck down the state's
expenditure prohibitions declaring that "[t]he speech proposed
by appellants is at the heart of the First Amendment's protec-
tion." To get to this decision, the Court framed the issue as a
matter of "whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives
this proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitle-
ment to protection.""o The Court rejected the proposition "that
speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First
Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a
corporation.""
Bellotti also rejected a primary argument relied on by propo-
nents of restricting corporate political activity. Massachusetts
74. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59 (declaring the limits an infringement on
the ability to "engage in protected political expression," which are "restrictions
that the First Amendment cannot tolerate").
75. Id. at 16-19 ("A restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is
because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society
requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill
or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies gen-
erally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's
increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and
information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable
instruments of effective political speech."). Id. at 19.
76. See infra Part III.B.
77. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768 (1978) (quot-
ing MASS. GIN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977) (amended 2010)).
78. Id. at 769.
79. Id. at 776.
80. Id. at 778.
81. Id. at 784.
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argued that the state law served a legitimate governmental inter-
est in protecting corporate shareholders from having corporate
resources spent "in furtherance of views with which some share-
holders may disagree." 2 The Court rejected this argument as
being both underinclusive and overinclusive." It was underin-
clusive because corporations, while not being able to spend
money on referendums, may spend money to support or defeat
legislation through various lobbying activities. 84 It was overinclu-
sive because it prohibited "corporation [s] from supporting or
opposing a referendum proposal even if its shareholders unani-
mously authorized the contribution or expenditure.""
Buckley's and Bellotti's prohibitions on speaker-based restric-
tions came into question after the Supreme Court further
restricted corporate political spending. A decade after these two
cases, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld
a Michigan state law that prohibited corporate independent
expenditures." The Court identified antidistortion as a new gov-
ernmental interest for why the state could restrict this type of
political speech. 7 The Court defined antidistortion as Michi-
gan's interest in preventing "the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation
to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas.""
The Court found that this interest was "a sufficiently compelling
rationale to support its restriction on independent expenditures
by corporations.""
82. Id. at 792-93.
83. Id. at 793-95.
84. Id. at 793.
85. Id. at 794.
86. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990)
(holding that nonprofit corporation Michigan Chamber of Commerce could
not use general treasury funds for a newspaper ad supporting a candidate for
state office), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
87. Id. at 658-60. The Court accepted this antidistortion argument on
the suggestion that it prevents corruption. Id. at 659-60. The Court com-
mented that "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth" are "a different type of corruption in the political arena" than the typi-
cal quid pro quo agreement. Id. In contrast, where Buckley permitted the gov-
ernment to limit political speech, on direct contributions, the Court explicitly
cited the corruption of quid pro quo agreements as a sufficient justification for
the limitations. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-29 (1976); see also supra note
53.
88. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
89. Id.
3392012]
340 NOTIE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26
Despite Buckley and Bellotti rejecting the anti-corruption and
shareholder protection arguments,".1 after Austin, the Court
seemed to say that the federal and state governments may still
restrict corporate political speech, so long as those governments
rely on the antidistortion argument. Other than to suggest that
there might be a link to corruption,"' the Austin Court did not
clarify why antidistortion is a compelling interest, but anticorrup-
tion and shareholder protection are not. This discrepancy
between the Buckley and Austin lines of precedent and the uncer-
tainty over what types of corporate political activity is permitted
set the conditions for the Citizens United challenge.
III. CrIIZENS UNITED: THE ROBERTS COURT'S DEREGULATION
OF CORPORATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
A. What the Court Had to Decide
The Citizens United controversy over corporate political
speech actually began as a nonprofit's preemptory action against
potential civil and criminal penalties." Citizens United is a non-
profit that " [t] hrough a combination of education, advocacy, and
grass roots organization . . . seeks to reassert the traditional
American values of limited government, freedom of enterprise,
strong families, and national sovereignty and security."" Prior to
the Democratic Party's 2008 presidential primary elections, Citi-
zens United sought to distribute Hillary: The Movie via video-on-
demand." The movie contained interviews about Senator Hil-
lary Clinton, which the Court described as "quite critical of Sena-
tor Clinton"" and as "an appeal to vote against Senator
Clinton."" To advertise the movie on broadcast and cable televi-
sion, the organization produced two ten-second ads and one
thirty-second ad." Citizens United funded the documentary, its
advertisements, and the organization's general operations with
donations." Most of the donations came from individuals, but
the organization also accepted donations from for-profit
corporations."
90. See supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
91. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
92. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010).
93. Who We Are, CITIZENS UNITn, http://www.citizensunited.org/who-we-
are.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
94. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 890.
97. Id. at 914.
98. Id. at 887.
99. Id.
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Citizens United brought a declaratory and injunctive action
against the FEC because the group feared that its movie and its
ads would violate FECA's § 441b.o Section 441b prohibits any
corporation or union "from using general treasury funds to make
direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures
that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate,
through any form of media, in connection with certain qualified
federal elections."' Originally, FECA only prohibited express
advocacy, but the Bipartisan Campaign Act of 2002 ("BCRA") 102
amended § 441b to include a prohibition on any "electioneering
communication" as well.1 os Electioneering communication is
"'any broadcast, cable or satellite communication' that 'refers to
a clearly identified candidate for Federal office' and is made
within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election."' 0 4
The FEC has further defined electioneering communications as
those that are "publicly distributed."' 0 If the individual is a can-
didate for president, then "publicly distributed" means any com-
munication that "[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons in
a State where a primary election . . . is being held within thirty
days."10 6
If Citizens United violated § 441b's "ban on corporate-
funded independent expenditures," the organization would be
subject to civil and criminal penalties established by FECA's
§ 43 7g.o0 By bringing the declaratory and injunctive action
against the FEC, Citizens United argued that § 441b is unconsti-
tutional as applied to the movie.' Relying on Supreme Court
precedent, the district court held that § 441b was constitutional
both facially and as applied to the movie.' Despite the district
100. Id. at 888.
101. Id. at 887 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000) (amended 2002)).
102. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 2, 18, 28, 36, and 47).
103. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2)
(2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
104. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (3) (A)
(2006)).
105. Id. at 887.
106. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (quoting 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.29(b) (3) (ii) (2011)).
107. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888; see also 2 U.S.C. § 4 37 g (2006).
108. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. Citizens United also argued that
BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure requirements for independent expenditures
are unconstitutional as applied to the movie and the ads. Id. Since this Note is
only examining to what extent corporations may participate in U.S. elections,
this secondary argument will not be explored or discussed.
109. Id.; see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct, 876 (2010).
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court's reliance on McConnell v. FEC, the Supreme Court over-
ruled McConnell's holding, on both constitutional claims,"" and
in the process changed campaign finance rules for corporations.
Before explaining why the ban on corporate independent
expenditures is unconstitutional, the Court detailed several rea-
sons why it had to decide this issue. The Court first clarified why,
for technical reasons, the movie fell within the definitions of
§ 441b and thus could not be decided on narrower grounds.'''
The Court held that the movie did qualify as an "electioneering
communication," under 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(a)(i)'s defini-
tion.' The Court considered the movie to be express advo-
cacy." The Court did not think an exception should be created
either for communication released via video-on-demand'" or for
"nonprofit corporate political speech funded overwhelmingly by
individuals."' "
The Court also explained why, for freedom of speech pur-
poses, it had to accept the facial challenge to § 441b.'"' "Section
441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a
PAC created by a corporation can still speak."' ' The Court
asserted that corporations do have First Amendment protection.
It first made this assertion by relying on a line of Supreme Court
cases."' Next, the Court explained how "[t]his protection has
been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political
speech.""' In sum, "the Court has thus rejected the argument
110. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
111. Id. at 888-92.
112. Id. at 888-89 (explaining that since Citizens United wanted to dis-
tribute the movie using a cable video-on-demand system with 34.5 million sub-
scribers, the movie could be received by 50,000 people; therefore, the
requirements of 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) are met).
113. Id. at 889-90 ("[T]he film would be understood by most viewers as
an extended criticism of Senator Clinton's character and her fitness for the
office of the Presidency. . . . [T]here is no reasonable interpretation of Hillary
other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton.").
114. Id. at 890-91 (explaining that the Court should not get into decid-
ing "which means of communications are to be preferred for the particllar type
of message and speaker").
115. Id. at 891-92 (reasoning that even with a case-by-case analysis, some
political speech would be chilled).
116. Id. at 892-896 ("[Tlhe Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower
ground without chilling political speech.").
117. Id. at 897-98 (describing many of the regulations that PACs must
abide by in order to engage in political activity).
118. Id. at 899-900. Some of those cases include First Nat'l Bank of Bos-
ton v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976);
and Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
119. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 428-29 (1963) ("We hold that the activities of the NAACP ... are modes of
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that political speech of corporations or other associations should
be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because
such associations are not 'natural persons.'"' 20 Under § 441b,
corporations had been treated differently. The Government
argued that, even if the First Amendment fully protected the
political speech of corporations, three compelling interests per-
mitted the prohibition on corporate independent expenditures:
(1) antidistortion; (2) anticorruption; and, (3) shareholder pro-
tection. In rehashing and reconciling the divide between Buckley
and Austin, the Court addressed each of these three arguments.
B. What the Court Decided
First, the Court dismissed the Government's reliance on the
Austin antidistortion interest from an idealistic, freedom of
speech perspective. 1 2 ' At the outset of this reasoning, the Court
noted that "[p]olitical speech is 'indispensable to decisionmak-
ing in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech
comes from a corporation rather than an individual."'"2 Since
political speech holds such stature, the Court explained that the
Government may not discriminate against speakers based on the
resources enabling them to speak.123 The Court claimed that
Austin perpetuated such discrimination, by focusing on corpora-
tions, and in the process, interfered "with the 'open marketplace'
of ideas protected by the First Amendment."l 24
The Court reasoned that the antidistortion argument had
problems from a practical perspective as well. Focusing on
media corporations, the Court argued that "under the Govern-
ment's [antidistortion] reasoning, wealthy media corporations
could have their voices diminished to put them on par with other
media entities," and this "would produce the dangerous, and
unacceptable, consequence that Congress could ban political
expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. . . .")).
120. Id. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776).
121. Id. at 904-08.
122. Id. at 904 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777) (The inherent "worth of
the speech 'does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corpora-
tion, association, union, or individual.'"). Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)).
123. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48) ("Buckley rejected the premise
that the Government has an interest 'in equalizing the relative ability of individ-
uals and groups to influence the outcome of elections."'). Id.
124. Id. at 906 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552
U.S. 196, 208 (2008)).
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speech of media corporations."22 Furthermore, a ban on corpo-
rate independent expenditures would most drastically affect
small businesses and associations. "[W]ealthy corporations could
still lobby elected officials . . . [aind wealthy individuals and
unincorporated associations can spend unlimited amounts on
independent expenditures."' " The Court made it clear that the
Austin antidistortion argument fails, on both an idealistic and a
practical level.
Although the Government pushed the antidistortion princi-
ple as its primary argument, it also relied on the Buckley anticor-
ruption argument. Again, the Court dismissed the Government's
argument for idealistic and practical reasons. The Buckley Court
did not think that the anticorruption argument was strong
enough to justify an independent expenditure ban or a limit on
individuals.' 27 Following Buckley's lead, the Citizens United Court
concluded that "independent expenditures, including those
made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance." 12 ' To support its position, the Court noted that
quid pro quo agreements are covered by federal bribery laws.'12
Additionally, the record in McConnellwas "over 100,000 pages" so
and had no "direct examples of votes being exchanged for ...
expenditures."'"' Thus, the outright ban on corporate indepen-
dent expenditures realistically was not needed to prevent quid
pro quo agreements.
The Court also sought to dismiss the anticorruption argu-
ment from an idealistic perspective. In balancing the value of
free speech against the governmental interest in preventing cor-
ruption, the Court noted that " [l]imits on independent expendi-
tures, such as § 441b, have a chilling effect extending well
beyond the Government's interest in preventing quid pro quo cor-
ruption."' 3 2 Even if independent expenditures lead to "influ-
ence over or access to elected officials," this does not mean that
elected "officials are corrupt."" Influence and access are inevi-
125. Id. at 905-06 ("The law's exception for media corporations is, on its
own terms, all lit an admission of the invalidity of the antidistortion
rationale.")
126. Id. at 908.
127. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
128. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
129. Id. at 908; 18 U.S.C. § 201.
130. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
131. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Stipp. 2d 176, 209 (D.D.C. 2003), rmd,
540 U.S. 93, overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (opinion of Kollar-
Kotelly, J.).
132. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
133. Id. at 910.
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table in a representative democracy.'-" "The appearance of
influence or access," the Court explained, "will not cause the
electorate to lose faith in our democracy."33 The Court believed
that it properly balances the electorate's right to political speech
and protection from government corruption.
While emphasizing the idealistic freedom of speech con-
cerns as a means to reject the Government's primary and secon-
dary arguments, the Court dismissed the Government's last
concern solely for practical reasons. The Government's final
argument was that dissenting shareholders should be protected
"from being compelled to fund corporate political speech."13
The Court concisely pointed out how this argument, like the Aus-
tin antidistortion principle, "would allow the Government to ban
the political speech even of media corporations."13 7 Further-
more, the Court reasoned that if protecting shareholder interests
was Congress's concern, then the statute was both underinclusive
and overinclusive.'" 8 It was underinclusive because it only
blocked certain media within thirty days of a primary and sixty
days of a general election.'"3 It was overinclusive "because it cov-
ers all corporations, including nonprofit corporations and for-
profit corporations with only single shareholders."1 4 0 From a
practical perspective, the Court did not believe the statute
advanced the Government's interests.
Although the Court does not touch upon idealistic freedom
of speech concerns when rebutting the Government's share-
holder protection argument, it is important to note how much
emphasis the Court placed on these concerns throughout the
opinion. The Court's language is straightforward and unambigu-
ous when explaining that the opinion overrules Austin and "the
part of McConnell that upheld BCRA § 203's extension of§ 441b's restrictions on corporate independent expenditures.""'
Yet, in order to get to that point, the Court used quite romantic
language to explain the importance of the freedom of speech in
democracies"' 2 and the inherent dangers of restricting political
134. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
135. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
136. Id. at 911.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 913.
142. Id. at 899 ("By contrast, it is inherent in the nature of the political
process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in
order to determine how to cast their votes."); id. at 906 (quoting N.Y. State Bd.
of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)) (referring to political
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speech.'14 Some commentators might argue that such flowery
language is characteristic of any opinion written by Associate Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy.' 4 4 However, the lofty rhetoric should not
cause one to disregard the overarching significance of the opin-
ion. The Court sends a clear message that, regardless of whether
the speaker is an individual, a corporation, or a union, the First
Amendment guarantees protection of political speech, and any
restrictions on this speech will be subject to strict scrutiny.
C. The Practical Implications
Citizens United did not, despite President Obama's State of
the Union claims, overturn one hundred years of precedent. 145
speech as the "'open marketplace' of ideas"); id. at 917 (quoting McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 341 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 976 (2010))
("'The First Amendment Underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create
in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free to use new forms,
and new forums, for the expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to the
people, and the Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct
it.'"); see also id. at 898 ("Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it
is the means to hold officials accountable to the people."); id. ("The right of
citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus
is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to pro-
tect it.").
143. Id. at 899 ("By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to
others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right
to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's
voice."); id. ("The Government may not ... deprive the public of the right and
privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consid-
eration."); id. at 917 (asserting that a blackout period for independent expendi-
tures forces speech to "be suppressed in the realm where its necessity is most
evident: in the public dialogue preceding a real election"); see also id. at 882,
892, 895 (holding that any restrictions or rules for regulating political speech
create a "chilling" effect).
144. See, e.g., Clifford R. Goldstein,justice Kennedy's "Notoious Mystery Pas-
sage," LaIRry (July-Aug. 1997), http://www.libertymagazine.org/index.php?id
=1585; Garrett Epps & Dahlia Lithwick, The Sphinx of Sacramento: Will the Real
Anthony Kennedy Please Stand Up?, SIATE (Apr. 27, 2007, 6:01 PM), http://www.
slate.com/id/2165133/; Rich Lowry, America's Worstjustice, NAT'i. Rvv. ONL.INE
(Jiil. 1, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/224915/
americas-worst-justice/rich-lowry; Eric A. Posner, The Decider, NI.:w REPunuIc
(Jan. 11, 2010, 12:04 AM), http://www.tnr.com/book/review/the-decider
(reviewing FRANK J. CoIUCCI, JUSTIcE Kl.NNtnv'sJuRla'RunI'NC..: THF. Fulm. AN)
NECESSARY MFlANING OF LInRTy (2009)). See generally Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.").
145. Several courts have recognized that Citizens United did not overturn
the Tillman Act's ban on direct corporate contributions. See Thalheiner v. City
of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he Citizens United
Court expressly did not extend its holding to the contribution context."); Minn.
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Although 1907's Tillman Act prohibited corporations and unions
from making direct contributions to candidates 4 6 and 1947's
Taft-Hartley Act outlawed independent expenditures from gen-
eral treasury funds, 4 7 enforcement of campaign finance laws
remained largely ineffective for decades.14 8 As a result, in 1971
FECA revamped the entire system and, in the process created an
exemption for corporations and unions to use general treasury
funds for "the establishment, administration, and solicitation of
contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for
political purposes."' 4 9 These "separate segregated funds," also
known as Political Action Committees ("PACs"), can collect "con-
tributions from a limited class of individuals and [can use] this
money to make contributions and expenditures to influence fed-
eral elections." 5 o Through these PACs, corporations and unions
have had vehicles to voice political speech, and even express
advocacy.' 5 '
By overruling Austin and part of McConnell, the Court's deci-
sion altered the Taft-Hartley restrictions but not the Tillman
Act's explicit ban on direct corporate-to-candidate contributions.
Corporations are still not allowed to donate directly to candi-
dates, whether in cash or in-kind.' 5 2 What has changed is that
corporations and unions may now use general treasury funds to
Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 319 (8th Cir. 2011),
("Minnesota can generally ban all direct corporate contributions"), reh'g en banc
granted, opinion vacated (July 12, 2011). But see United States v. Danielczyk, No.
1:11cr85 (JCC), 2011 WL 2268063, at *6 (E.D. Va. June 7, 2011) ("2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a)'s flat ban on direct corporate contributions to political campaigns is
unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances of this case, as opposed to being
unconstitutional as applied to all corporate donations.").
146. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 54; see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2011).
148. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
149. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(b) (2011).
150. Separate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected PACs, supra note 67. The
limited class for corporations is defined as stockholders, executive personnel,
administrative personnel and family members. 11 C.F.R. § 114 .5(g) (1) (2011).
For unions, the limited class is union members, executive personnel, adminis-
trative personnel, and family members. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(g) (2) (2011). In con-
trast to Separate Segregated Funds, Nonconnected PACs can solicit the general
public, and they must use these contributions to establish and support the oper-
ations of the PAC. Separate Segregated Funds and Nonconnected PACs, supra note 67,
at 1-2.
151. See generally Press Release, Fed. Election Comm'n, PAC Activity
Remains Steady in 2009 (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/
press2010/20100406PAC.shtml (detailing that 4,618 PACs raised $555.7 mil-
lion, spent $464.6 million, and contributed $174.4 million to candidates in
2009).
152. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
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expressly advocate for a candidate's election or defeat.13 They
also may now use such funds to pay for "electioneering commu-
nications," which had been prohibited by BCRA § 203."'
The Court's rejection of Austin left "no basis for allowing the
Government to limit corporate independent expenditures."'
Without any limitations on independent expenditures, corpora-
tions no longer have to rely on PACs to engage in the political
process and, maybe most significantly, may spend as much
money as they can afford. From the Court's perspective, not hav-
ing to rely on a PAC should promote political speech since PACs
" [do] not allow corporations to speak," are "burdensome alterna-
tives," and are "expensive to administer and subject to extensive
regulations.""' The Court's declaration that § 441b is unconsti-
tutional meant that Citizens United could make Hillary: The
Movie available via video-on-demand without being subject to§ 437's civil and criminal penalties.
D. The Congressional Reaction
Many members of Congress reacted swiftly to the Citizens
United decision. Following the President's tone at the State of
the Union, members in the House and Senate introduced several
bills to correct the decision's many misperceptions.'5 7 Congres-
sional members also held hearings to investigate how the legisla-
ture could respond to the Court's decision.'15  Among
Congress's many concerns about the decision, several members
153. Id. at 913.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 897.
157. Many bills, proposed in the days after the decision, focused on the
misperception that Citizens United now permits foreign corporations to engage
in the U.S. political process. See Prevent Foreign Influence in our Elections Act,
H.R. 4540, 111th Cong. (2010); American Elections Act of 2010, S. 2959, 111th
Cong. (2010); Save Our Democracy From Foreign Influence Act of 2010, H.R.
4523, 111th Cong. (2010); Prohibiting Foreign Influence in American Elections
Act, H.R. 4522, 111th Cong. (2010); Freedom From Foreign-Based Manipula-
tion in American Elections Act of 2010, H.R. 4517, 111th Cong. (2010);
America is for Americans Act, H.R. 4510, 111th Cong. (2010); Prohibiting For-
eign Influence in American Elections Act, S. 2954, 111th Cong. (20t0).
158. See First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform After Citizens United:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the
H. Comm. on the judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Corporate Governance After Citizens
United Hearings, supra note 1; "We the People?" Corporate Spending in American Elec-
tions After Citizens United: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2010); Corporate America vs. the Voter: Examining the Supreme Court's Decision to
Allow Unlimited Corporate Spending in Elections: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules
&Admin., 111th Cong. (2010).
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focused on the corporate governance issues. 9 These efforts
have resulted in the Shareholder Protection Act of 2011.1 0 The
Act proposed amending the Securities and Exchange Act of
193416' to create several regulatory restrictions on corporate
political activity. The Shareholder Protection Act would require
corporations to obtain shareholder approval of corporate politi-
cal activity, disclose the money spent on political activities, and
acquire board of director support before spending significant
sums. 162 As will be discussed, there are problems with each of
these proposals that make the Act an unnecessary regulation.
Fortunately, the Act has not become law. 63 Unfortunately, con-
gressional dissatisfaction with Citizens United did not die with the
Shareholder Protection Act. There may still be greater govern-
mental restrictions on corporate political speech.' 6 4 Part III will
explain why these regulations create extra regulatory burdens for
corporations.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS'S ATTEMPT TO REGULATE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE POST-CITIZENS UNITED
A. Campaign Finance Post-Citizens United
Citizens United did not "open the floodgates" for corporate
spending in political campaigns."' It simply highlighted how
much money had been gushing into the system for years. As dis-
cussed, previous events in the last century also focused the
nation's attention on corporate political activity. 166 Despite the
concerns raised by these events and the political reactions, cor-
porate money continued to flow into political campaigns."' The
159. See Corporate Governance After Citizens United Hearings, supra note 1.
160. H.R. 2517, 112th Cong. (2011).
161. Id. sec. 3, § 14C.
162. H.R. 2517
163. The Act has been introduced and referred to the House Committee
on Financial Services. The Committee, however, has not taken any action on
the Act. See GovTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-
2517 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
164. See Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in
Elections Act (DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 111th
Cong. (2010). In the last Congress, the House passed the DISCLOSE Act, but
the Senate failed to bring it to a vote. See GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=hill-5175 (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). It is unlikely to be
introduced in this new Congress. See Richard L. Hasen, Kirk Offers Hope vs. Secret
Donors, POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2010, 4:45 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/sto
ries/1 I 10/44718.html.
165. 2010 State of the Union, supra note 2.
166. See supra Part I. A-B.
167. Id.
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lack of proper enforcement mechanisms in campaign finance
legislation contributed to this increasing flow of corporate
money."" Yet, even after Congress created the FEC to enforce
campaign finance laws,"' corporations still spent heavily on
political activity." Although Citizens United did nothing to
reverse this trend, and it may have even contributed to an
increase in corporate political spending, the reality is that previ-
ous laws had also not prevented significant corporate political
spending.'' Now may be the time to recognize that, notwith-
standing much wishful hoping, our political system will never be
entirely free from corporate money.
At least for the foreseeable future, the main reason why cor-
porate money will continue to flow into politics is because the
Roberts Court is unlikely to uphold restrictions on First Amend-
ment-protected speech. Before John G. Roberts, Jr. became
ChiefJustice in 2005, the Supreme Court recognized that money
spent on political activity may be considered speech for First
Amendment purposes.' Since 2005, the Court has struck down
several attempts to regulate money spent on political activity, cit-
ing the importance of speech in the American democratic pro-
cess.'7 The Court's language in Citizens United suggests that it is
168. Id.
169. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
170. For the 1987-88 political cycle, which included the 1988 presidential
election, the FEC reported that 2008 corporate PACs had contributed over $56
million to candidates. After the 1999-2000 election cycle, which included the
2000 presidential election, the FEC reported that 1725 corporate PACs contrib-
uted over $91 million to candidates. Press Release, Fed. Election Conn'n, His-
torical Overview of PAC Financial Activity (May 31, 2001), available at http://
www.fec.gov/press/press2001/053101pacfdiid/pachisOO.htm.
171. See T.W. Farnam, 72 Super PACs Spent $83.7 Million On Election, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 4, 2010, at A3 (reporting that corporations, unions, and associations
took advantage of loosened campaign finance regulations); see also Press
Release, The Campaign Fin. Inst., Non-Party Spending Doubled in 2010 But
Did Not Dictate The Results (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.cfinst.org/Press/
PReleases/10-11-05/Non-PartySpendingDoubledButDidNotDictate_
Results.aspx (estimating that non-party groups spent $280 million, an increase
of 130% from 2008, on independent expenditures and electioneering
communications).
172. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
173. In June of the Court's October 2010 terni, Chief Justice Roberts
authored the opinion that struck down Arizona's public financing system for
political campaigns. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act provided pub-
lic funds for the primary and general election campaigns of candidates for state
office. Id. at 2813. The Act also matched, dollar-for-dollar and up to a certain
extent, any amount in which a privately-funded candidate or independent
group exceeded the initial allotment of public funds. Id. at 2814. By explain-
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not likely to accept restrictions on corporate political speech any
time soon.' 7 4 Combine this judicial reluctance to regulate cam-
paign finance with an electorate concerned about corporate
political activity,' 75 and it creates an interesting predicament for
corporations.
ing how this negatively impacted any candidate wishing to raise and spend as
much money as possible, the Court struck down Arizona's law as inhibiting
"robust and wide-open political debate without sufficient justification." Id. at
2829.
In Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008), the Court struck down the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 319(a)-(b). These sections required any self-
financing candidate for public office to declare their intent to spend more than
$350,000 of their own money. If a candidate declared this intent, then their
opponent would be permitted to receive contributions from individuals that
exceeded the normal limits. The Court struck down these sections as an uncon-
stitutional burden on an individual's First Amendment rights by forcing the
candidate to choose between the "right to engage in unfettered political speech
and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations." 554 U.S. at 739.
A year earlier, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007),
the Court weakened the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act sections that would
later be declared unconstitutional in Citizens United. BCRA's § 203 prohibited
any "electioneering communication" from being aired thirty days before a pri-
mary and sixty days before a general election. Whereas Citizens United dealt with
the use of general treasury funds for express advocacy, Wisconsin Right to Life
("WRTL") dealt with general treasury funds for issue advocacy. Distinguishing
issue advocacy from express advocacy, the Court struck down BCRA § 203 as
applied to WRTL's issue ads. ChiefJustice Roberts used noticeably strong lan-
guage to reject the idea that issue advocacy is equivalent to campaign contribu-
tions and thus, should be subjected to regulation. 551 U.S. at 478 ("Enough is
enough.").
In ChiefJustice Robert's first full year, the Court struck down both expen-
diture limits and, in a rare occasion, contribution limits. Randall v. Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230 (2006). Vermont had enacted a campaign finance system that limited
the amounts candidates could spend on their campaigns. Finding no reason to
overrule the prohibition on personal expenditure limits set by Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976), and citing the series of cases that have since upheld Buckley,
the Court struck down Vermont's expenditures limits. Randall, 548 U.S. at
240-46. Vermont's system had also set a very low limit for the amount that
could be donated to candidate's campaigns. The Court struck down these lim-
its as well, finding that the limits were so low that they did notjustify the state's
Interest in preventing corruption. Id. at 246-53.
See generally Robert Barnes, In Wis., Feingold Feels Impact of Court Ruling,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 1, 2010, at A8; Adam Liptak, The Most Conservative Court in
Decades, N.Y. TIMiEs, July 25, 2010, at Al.
174. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
175. According to a Washington Post-ABC News poll, "[e]ight in 10
respondents said they opposed a Supreme Court ruling last month that allows
unfettered political spending by corporations, with 65 percent 'strongly'
opposed." Eggen, supra note 11.
3512012]1
352 NOTRE DAME ()JOURNAL OF IAW, ETI:S & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26
B. The Corporate Conundrum
For-profit corporations do not exist primarily to influence
public policy. Traditionally, the recognized legal purpose of
such corporations is to maximize the investments of its share-
holders.1 16 The law is clear that management's primary goal
should be to increase profits.' 7 The law is less clear, however,
on what measures management should use to achieve these
goals. This is particularly true as the corporate structure has
evolved and shareholder ownership has become more dis-
persed."' There is a clear divide between shareholders' owner-
ship of the corporation and management's control of the
corporation, both legally and as a practical matter for many cor-
porations, including large corporations.' 7" As a result of this
divide, courts have been very deferential to management when
reviewing mismanagement claims."s
Judicial deference to management decisions applies even
when the connection to corporate profits is not completely clear.
For example, courts have accepted the idea that corporations
may donate to charitable organizations, as long as there is a
rational relationship to shareholders' interests.'"' State laws
have reflected this change.'1 2 That "rational relationship" most
often comes down to the "goodwill" that corporations retain
from the public for supporting philanthropic endeavors.' How
176. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.").
177. Id.
178. See AnowF A. BFRiF & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PRoiiR-ry 112-16 (special ed. 1991) (explaining how there is
a separation between ownership and control in modern corporations).
179. Id.
180. Courts apply what is known as the "Business Judgment Rule." See
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). The rule oper-
ates to "protect corporate officers and directors and the decisions they make,"
and not to have courts "second-guess these businessjudgments." Id. "To rebut
the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that
directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads
of their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due care." Id.
181. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (permit-
ting corporate donations to a university so long as donations were rationally
related to benefit the corporation).
182. See DEL. Con ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2001) (permitting boards to
"[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educa-
tional purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency").
183. See Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U.
CHI. L. REv'. 1191, 1193 (2002) (describing corporate charitable donations as
"'goodwill' gifts ... that arguably will produce future intangible benefits from a
favorable public image of the firm"). Other scholars have argued that corpora-
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a corporation purchases that "goodwill" by deciding which chari-
ties to support is a management decision. Many scholars have
argued that corporate charity has led to wasteful spending,
plagued by executives' conflicts-of-interests.' 84 Regardless of
management's true intentions, as discussed, courts give great def-
erence to executives' decisions on corporate charity. 1 5
Unlike corporate charity, corporate political spending does
have tangible benefits, and corporations therefore should be free
to engage in political activity. Now that Citizens United has
relaxed the regulatory burdens on corporate political activity,
management has to decide whether to contribute corporate
money for independent expenditures. There are two primary
drawbacks to corporate political activity. First, corporations have
different constituencies, including shareholders, executives, the
board of directors, and consumers, who likely all have different
political ideologies. Within those constituencies, there may also
be a diverse array of political ideologies. It is easy to offend a
particular constituent through political activity, which could
result in a harmful backlash against the corporation.' Second,
similar to the decision to spend corporate charitable donations,
there are inherent conflicts-of-interest and ethical concerns
regarding the decision to engage in political speech. 1 7
tions donate because they are motivated by altruism. See M. Todd Henderson &
Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market For Altruism, 109 COLUM. L.
REv. 571, 571-72 (2009). Whatever may be a corporation's motivation to
donate, it is still difficult to quantify how donations improve shareholders'
investments.
184. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities,
and the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. RL~v. 1147, 1149 (1997) (explaining
how many CEOs use corporate donations to advance their own personal inter-
ests with "little, if any benefit, to the corporation"); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pan-
dora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA
L. REv. 579, 586 (1997) ("The absence of substantive regulation, in combina-
tion with the absence of a disclosure requirement, has meant that corporate
senior executives have had a blank check to make corporate charitable contri-
butions independent of both business objectives and shareholder prefer-
ences."); see also Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 50-51 (Del. 1991) (upholding a
shareholder settlement after a CEO had the company provide the funds for a
museum that would display his personal art collection).
185. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
186. See Emily Friedman, Target, Best Buy Angers Gay Customers By Making
Contribution to GOP Candidate, ABC NEWS (July 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.
com/Business/target-best-buy-fire-campaign-contributions-minnesota-candi
date/story?id=11270194 (explaining that companies were boycotted over deci-
sions to donate to a political group supporting the Republican Party's Minne-
sota gubernatorial candidate).
187. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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The potential benefits from corporate political activity and
the potential consequences of not engaging in corporate politi-
cal activity may outweigh any potential drawbacks. Moreover, the
decision of whether corporate political activity is beneficial to the
corporation and its shareholders should generally rest, as do
most corporate decisions, with the corporation's management.
To be clear, the express advocacy permitted by Citizens United is
not much different from the issue advocacy that has been going
on for years.'" Whether a corporation is expressly advocating
support or defeat of a candidate, condemning a candidate's poli-
cies through issue advocacy, or contributing to an organization
that will engage in both express and issue advocacy, the results
are often tangible. Elections provide the opportunity to debate
potential public policy issues and regulations. Through political
activity, corporations can promote those candidates whose public
policy positions will have a positive impact on the corporation's
business.'"" Alternatively, corporations that do not voice their
political concerns could risk dealing with a government that is
unaware of policies negatively impacting the corporation or,
worse, openly hostile to a corporation's interests. The "other
people's money" argument should not carry much weight when
today's corporations have a clear divide between management
and ownership, 9 0o courts give great deference to management's
business decisions,'"' and corporations might be hampered by
potential governmental regulations. 9 2
188. Although not done by a corporation, one of the most egregious
examples of issue advocacy occurred in a 1996 Montana congressional election.
An advertisement described one of the candidates, Bill Yellowtail, as a convicted
felon, who slapped his wife and failed to pay child support. The ad then
encouraged viewers to call Yellowtail and tell him to support family values.
While not expressly advocating Yellowtail's defeat, the ad was clear in its opposi-
tion to Yellowtail. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 194 n.78 (2003) overruled
by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 976 (2010).
189. See Peter A. Brown, The Bigger Meaning: High Court Lets Companies
Lobby Employees, Suppliers, WAl. ST. J.-CAPITAL. J. (Feb. 3, 2010, 11:30 AM),
http://blogs.vsj.com/capitaljournal/2010/02/03/the-bigger-meaning-igh-
court-lets-companies-lobby-employees-suppliers/ (explaining how Citizens
United permits corporations to lobby employees on how to vote).
190. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
192. See Winkler, supra note 21, at 873 (attributing original corporate
campaign finance regulations to corporate executives who misappropriated
shareholders' "money to purchase legislation benefiting the executives
themselves").
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C. Why Disclosure and Approval Procedures
are a Regulatory Overreaction
In an era where an oil company caused an eco-disaster in the
Gulf of Mexico,' 9  car companies have been taken over by the
federal government,' 9 4 and Wall Street banks received a $700 bil-
lion bailout," it is not surprising that there is a clamoring for
greater regulation of corporations. Congressional members and
scholars, in particular, suggest an increase in federal oversight
for corporations engaging in political activity in the wake of Citi-
zens United.' The primary recommendations to improve over-
sight include increasing disclosure of corporate political
activity,"' requiring independent director approval for expendi-
tures towards political activity, and insisting on shareholder
approval before corporations engage in political activity.' 9 8 The
primary assumptions driving these recommendations are that
corporate political activity is not an ordinary business decision,
greater disclosure will alleviate any distortion concerns, and,
thanks to Citizens United, corporations are now engaging in
express advocacy." 9 As this section explains, there are problems
with all of these recommendations, and the underlying assump-
193. See Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.
com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oilspills/gulf of mexico_2010/
index.html (last updated Sept. 14, 2011).
194. See Automotive Industry Crisis, N.Y. TIMEs, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit-crisis/auto_industry/index.html
(last updated May 25, 2011).
195. See Economic Crisis and Market Upheavels, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.ny
times.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit-crisis/index.html
(last updated Oct. 3, 2011).
196. See Corporate Governance After Citizens United Hearings, supra note 1; see
also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARv. L. REv. 83, 83-84 (2010); Carol R. Goforth, "A Corporation
Has No Soul"-Modern Corporations, Corporate Governance, and Involvement in the
Political Process, 47 Hous. L. REv. 617, 624 (2010); Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens
Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119
YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 53 (2009); Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader
Disclosure and Disclaimer For Corporate Electoral Advocacy In the Wake of Citizens
United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 622-24 (2010).
197. The disclosure at issue in these proposals deals only with disclosure
of political activity by the for-profit corporations, such as in Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. It does not deal with disclosure in communi-
cations paid for by the corporation or disclosure by special-purpose or conduit
organizations that receive corporate contributions. See infra note 207. These
issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
198. See supra note 196.
199. Id.
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tions, that make the calls for regulation another in the long line
of ineffective overreactions to corporate political activity."oo
Before discussing the practical problems with increased cor-
porate governance, it is important to note the problems with the
underlying assumptions driving the reform suggestions. Most
advocates for reform argue that corporate political activity is not
an "ordinary business decision," in which courts should give def-
erence to management, since there is the potential for too great
a divergence between shareholders' and management's inter-
ests."' This is a wrong assumption because politics, similar to
research and development or marketing, can have a significant
impact upon a corporation. Through politics, the American peo-
ple can assess which candidates, and the public policies and regu-
lations that they promote, will govern the country. Even if most
shareholders are aware of political candidates, it would be diffi-
cult to suggest that most shareholders fully understand how a
candidate's policies will impact the businesses in which those
shareholders are invested. *
Additionally, as discussed with today's public corporations,
shareholders invest in a company with the expectation that man-
agement will maximize their investment, and management has a
fiduciary duty to act in the corporation's interests. Management
is less likely to be conflicted about which political candidates may
have the greatest impact on their business. Shareholders, as citi-
zens, may have different priorities when electing candidates. 2 03
Some may vote for a candidate because of that candidate's for-
200. One issue that this section will not discuss, mainly because it
deserves more throrough analysis, is whether the SEC would be the most effec-
tive agency to regulate any disclosure requirements, particularly in comparison
to the FEC. For a similar discussion, see Professor Mayer's article examining
the merits of the FEC versus the IRS, in regards to regulating the tax-exempt
527 "political organizations." Lloyd Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institu-
tional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REv. 625 (2007).
201. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993),
and text in supra note 180. .
202. See WILLIAM H. FIANICAN & NANCY H. ZINGALE, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
OF THE AMERICAN EiECTORATE 180 (8th ed. 1994) (explaining how "in most
elections many voters are unaware of the stands taken by candidates on issues").
203. Political scientists have spent considerable time studying the pres-
ence of "single-issue" voters. See FIANIGAN & ZINGALE, supra note 202, 179-86.
These voters, "caring intensely about a particular issue, vote for whichever can-
didate is closest to their views on that issue, regardless of the candidate's party,
personal characteristics, or positions on other issues." Id. at 179. "The classic
example of single-issue voting in American politics was abolition, an issue of
such intensity that it destroyed the Whig party, launched several new parties
including the Republican Party, and was a major contributing factor to the Civil
War." Id. at 180.
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eign policy positions, while others may elect candidates based on
social issues. 204 Management, because of its fiduciary duties, will
not be a "single-issue" voter.205 It will have to assess a candidate's
entire platform to determine whether that candidate will act in a
manner that will help or hinder the corporation's activities and
bottom line. There is no particular reason to believe that man-
agement will be any more likely to disregard its fiduciary duties
in this context than in the many other contexts where its deci-
sions control.
Corporations also have been engaging in political activity for
years without any suggestions that shareholders need to advise on
these business decisions. Part II, supra, discussed some of the
more egregious examples of corporate political activity, but even
after the modern campaign finance reforms of the 1970's, corpo-
rations have engaged in political activity. Corporations employ
in-house and outside lobbyists to articulate how regulations
might impact their business.206 Although corporate PACs use
solicited donations to engage in express advocacy, corporations
use general treasury funds to establish and run PACs. This
includes hiring the staff that makes the decisions as to which can-
didates to support or oppose. Shareholders have never had any
input on these activities. Finally, corporations have for many
years funded political communications that fell short of express
advocacy and, more recently, electioneering communication that
still had the effect of influencing elections.
Corporate campaign finance reform advocates' other
assumptions are just as misleading. Reform advocates argue that
increased regulation will curb the distortion that results from
corporate political activity.20 7 It is true that increased regulation
might curb some corporate political activity. It does nothing,
however, to combat the distortion that can result from wealthy
individuals, unions, and close corporations spending unlimited
amounts of money to influence elections. Restricting corporate
204. Id. at 180.
205. Id.
206. In 2010, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, an association of busi-
nesses, spent $132,067,500 on lobbying activities-the highest amount in the
country. The next three highest spenders for lobbying activities were all corpo-
rations: PG&E Corp. ($45,460,000), General Electric ($39,290,000), and FedEx
($25,582,074). Lobbying Spending Database, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS: OPEN
SECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=2010&
indexType=s (last visited Oct.3, 2011).
207. The Supreme Court dismissed the antidistortion argument, which
the Government pushed in Citizens United, for both idealistic and practical free-
dom of speech reasons. See supra Part III.B-C.
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political activity in this sense, without restricting other sources,
might run afoul of the Court's constitutional concerns. 208
Another faulty assumption is that reform advocates believe
that corporations actually engaged in express advocacy after Citi-
zens United. There is no evidence supporting this proposition.
Corporations may have given to "special purpose entities," such
as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who now can use those dona-
tions for express advocacy.'o) Yet, before Citizens United, corpora-
tions had given to these organizations. 2"' The special purpose
entities may not have been able to use these donations for
express advocacy in the past, but the donations did free up other
money that could, in turn, be spent on express advocacy.' The
donations also could be used for communications that fell short
of express advocacy, yet still influence elections. From one per-
spective, Citizens United simply removed the barriers to political
208. See id.
209. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, GEWING THE GOVERNMENT AMERIcA
DESERVEs: How ETHics REFORM CAN MAKE A DIFFFRE.NCE, 236-39 (2009). Some
scholars have also referred to these as "conduit organizations." See Corporate
Governance After Citizens United Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement ofJohn C.
Coffee,Jr., Adolph A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School).
There is currently considerable debate over how to regulate some of these "spe-
cial purpose entities," particularly those that are registered as 501(c) (4) non-
profit organizations. These organizations, such as Crossroads Grassroots Policy
Strategies (GPS) on the right and Priorities USA Action on the left, are not
required to disclose their donors. As a result, the concern is that Citizens United
will inspire corporations to hide their political activity through these nonprofit
organizations. The debate is focused on whether these nonprofit organizations
should be required to disclose their donors, including corporations. This
debate is beyond the scope of this Note. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding
Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be
Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L.
& Pot'Y 59 (2011) (explaining how "a large percentage of outside political
spending in the federal midterms was masked through the use of non-profit
organizations" and how this spending might be regulated); Cory G. Kalanick,
Note, Blowing Up the Pipes: The Use of (c)(4) to Dismantle Campaign Finance Reform,
95 MINN. L. Rmv. 2254, 2255 (2011) (examining "the rise of§ 501 (c) (4) non-
profit organizations as a modern tool for bypassing campaign finance regula-
tion"); see also Michael Luo & Stephanie Strom, Donor Names Remain Secret as
Rules Shift, N.Y. TIMis, Sep. 21, 2010, at Al (describing the benefit of 501(c) (4)
organizations not having to disclose donor's identities, in contrast to 527 politi-
cal organization); Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Sets Sights on Donors' Gifts That Push
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at Al (reporting that the IRS may use tax provi-
sions to regulate money given for politcal purposes to § 501 (c) (4)).
210. Id.
211. ChiefJustice Roberts made a similar argument regarding terrorist
financing in a recent Supreme Court case. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro-
ject, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). The ChiefJustice held that money donated to a
designated terrorist organization for humanitarian purposes "frees up other
resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends." Id. at 2725.
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speech that had forced corporations to support PACs or special
purpose entities, which may perhaps result in more direct and
thus more transparent corporate political activity.
In addition to the problems with the underlying assump-
tions, there are several problems with the recommended reforms
that make them unnecessary. For those advocating disclosure,2 12
disclosure reveals corporate political activity only after it has
occurred, even with quarterly reporting. Shareholders do not
know, in real time, how corporations may attempt to influence
an election. Forcing disclosure in annual reports likely would be
ineffective because shareholders may not read the annual reports
or, if they have read the report, may not be terribly concerned
with an activity that has occurred in what is now, in political
terms, the relatively distant past.2 " Thus, disclosing corporate
political activity creates more regulatory work and financial costs
for corporations without likely creating much benefit to
shareholders. 2 14
Requiring independent board approval for corporate politi-
cal activity is another ineffective regulation. Campaign finance
reform advocates argue that corporate political activity is differ-
ent than "ordinary business decisions," because shareholders'
interests may diverge from directors' and executives' interests.
Under this assumption, there is no possibility for a corporate
board to be independent. Independent board members, similar
to shareholders, directors, and executives, have their own politi-
cal interests. Why can these individuals, but not other directors
212. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
213. See FRANK EASTERHROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUc-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAw 66 (1991) (explaining how shareholders do not have
"the appropriate incentive to study the firm's affairs and vote intelligently").
214. To understand the financial costs that companies incur when com-
plying with SEC reporting requirements, see the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's report on Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE AovisoRY COMMITEE ON SMALL Puntc
COMPANIES 33 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/
acspc-finalreport.pdf. Section 404 directed the SEC to adopt rules requiring
management reports on internal control over financial reporting. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 404. The SEC report
detailed Section 404 compliance costs as a percentage of a company's revenue.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALL
PUBLIC COMPANIES supra, at 33 Companies with a market capitalization of less
than $100 million spent 2.55% of revenue on compliance. Companies between
$100-$499 million spent 0.53% of revenue. Companies between $500-$999
million spent 0.27% of revenue. Companies between $1-$4.9 billion spent
0.16% of revenue. Companies with more than $5 billion in market capitaliza-
tion spent 0.06% of revenue. Id.
215. See supra Part IV.C.
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or executives, be assumed to place their own political prefer-
ences behind the political interests that are most important to
the corporation?
Shareholder approval is another recommendation that, in
actuality, would create more regulatory burdens than provide any
positive reform. There are two methods to provide for share-
holder approval: a blanket approval that permits management to
engage in corporate political activity, or approval each time that
management sought to expend money for corporate political
activity. For either of these approaches, obtaining a shareholder
vote on a particular issue is never a straight-forward activity.2 S
For the blanket approval approach, it is not clear how much
shareholder support is needed, how long the approval would last
or what types of corporate political activity would be approved.
For the every-time approval approach, considering how difficult
it is to coordinate a shareholder vote217 and how quickly time
moves in political campaigns,2 '8 corporations might miss the
opportunity to engage in political activity. Having to seek the
shareholders' approval would severely inhibit a corporation's
freedom of speech.
216. See EASTERHROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 213, at 66 (noting how the
costs of shareholder voting creates collective action problems, such as votes
rarely being held and shareholders not expecting their votes to be consequent-
ial). Professor Bainbridge has also written extensively about the problems with
shareholder voting and how shareholder votes do not exercise any effective
control over managerial decisions. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Lim-
ited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. Rjv. 601, 613, 623 (2006)
("[C]ollective action problems preclude the shareholders from exercising
meaningful day-to-day or even year-to-year control over managerial deci-
sions . . . . Even if one could overcome the seemingly intractable collective
action problems plaguing shareholder decisionmaking, active shareholder par-
ticipation in corporate decisionmaking would still be precluded by the share-
holders' widely divergent interests and distinctly different levels of
information."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rvv. 547, 570 (2003) (explaining how restric-
tions render shareholder voting ineffective by preventing shareholders from
owning "sufficient stock to exercise meaningful control over the firm" and
prohibiting shareholders from "band[ing] together to exercise such control").
217. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
218. The Internet and cable television have not only increased the
amount of coverage of political campaigns, they have also increased the speed
with which the media covers political campaigns. This has forced campaigns to
respond more quickly and to create more coverage for these media outlets. See
James Poniewozik, Campaign '08: The Media's 24-Minute News Cycle, TiME (Oct.
31, 2008), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,18
55330-1,00.html.
OPENING 7HE FLOODGATES?
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the politicized rhetoric, Citizens United did not "open
the floodgates" for corporate spending in the 2010 elections. 219
In the 2010 midterm election cycle, corporations did not seem
eager to participate directly through independent expendi-
tures. 220 While some corporations gave to independent groups
to further their political interests,2 2 1 the potential drawbacks to
electoral participation kept many corporations out of the politi-
cal arena.222 Corporations are owned by shareholders of all
political backgrounds. They hire employees of all political back-
grounds. They sell goods and services to customers of all politi-
cal backgrounds. Having to choose sides in an election could
possibly alienate a significant percentage of a corporation's
shareholders, employees or customers. Most corporations do not
want to take this kind of business risk.
Citizens United's greatest impact on the midterm elections
may have been in drawing attention to the vast amount of money
in politics. 22s If there had been any egregious examples of a cor-
poration attempting to influence the outcome of a specific race,
the political rhetoric about Citizens United may have been justi-
fied. Yet no such examples have emerged. Even without any sup-
port, Congress has attempted to increase government authority
over political speech.224 There might be other ways to curtail the
influence of money in politics without creating unnecessary regu-
latory burdens or unconstitutionally restricting the freedom of
speech,225 but the Shareholder Protection Act,226 and any legisla-
219. 2010 State of the Union, supra note 2.
220. See Brody Mullins & John D. McKinnon, Campaign's Big Spender: Pub-
lic-Employees Union Now Leads All Groups in Independent Election Outlays, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 22, 2010, at Al (detailing that unions and outside groups, but not corpo-
rations, were the biggest political spenders in 2009-10).
221. Id.
222. See Friedman, supra note 186.
223. See Farnam, supra note 171 (reporting that corporations, unions, and
associations took advantage of loosened campaign finance regulations).
224. See Shareholder Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2517, 112th Cong.
(2011); DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
225. Campaign finance reform proponents frequently argue for public
financing of political campaigns. In the previous Congress, a public financing
bill was introduced in both the House and Senate, but failed to become law. See
Fair Elections Now Act, S. 752 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 1826, 111th Cong.
(2010); see also FAIR ELECTIONs Now Acr, http://fairelectionsnow.org/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 3, 2011) (providing background information on the public financing
initiative). The merits of public financing of political campaigns warrants a sep-
arate article.
226. See H.R. 2517.
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tion with the same recommendations,m is not the most efficient
approach. Congress also should note that targeting one flow of
money, while ignoring the vast sums spent by wealthy individuals,
unions, and close corporations, does nothing to stop a flood.
227. See DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175.
